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Introduction 
A s long as there have been trials for violations of the laws and customs of war, more popularly known as "war crimes trials", the trial tribunals have 
been confronted with the defense of "superior orders"-the claim that the 
accused did what he did because he was ordered to do so by a superior officer 
(or by his Government) and that his refusal to obey the order would have brought 
dire consequences upon him. And as along as there have been trials for violations 
of the laws and customs of war the trial tribunals have almost uniformly rejected 
that defense. However, since the termination of the major programs of war 
crimes trials conducted after World War II there has been an ongoing dispute 
as to whether a plea of superior orders should be allowed, or disallowed, and, if 
allowed, the criteria to be used as the basis for its application. Does international 
action in this area constitute an invasion of the national jurisdiction? Should the 
doctrine apply to all war crimes or only to certain specifically named crimes? 
Should the illegality of the order received be such that any "reasonable" person 
would recognize its invalidity; or should it be such as to be recognized by a 
person of "ordinary sense and understanding"; or by a person of the "commonest 
understanding"? Should it be "illegal on its face"; or "manifesdy illegal"; or 
"palpably illegal"; or of "obvious criminality,,?1 An inability to reach a generally 
acceptable consensus on these problems has resulted in the repeated rejection of 
attempts to legislate internationally in this area. Consequendy, the continued 
existence of an international rule denying superior orders as a defense to a charge 
of violating the laws and customs of war appears to be injeopardy-ifit has not 
already ceased to exist? 
More than five centuries ago, when one Peter von Hagenbach was tried by 
an "international" tribunal for maltreating, and permitting his subordinates to 
maltreat, the inhabitants of the town ofBreisach while he was in command of 
what might be termed a military occupation (although the war did not begin 
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until thereafter), his defense was that his actions were in compliance with the 
orders of his master, the Duke of Burgundy. Even though complete obedience 
to the commands of one's liege lord was a way of life in the fifteenth century, 
and even though human life, particularly of civilians, was not respected then as 
it is today, von Hagenbach was found guilty and he was sentenced to death.3 
Similarly, in 1865, at the conclusion of the American Civil War, when 
Captain Henry Wirz, the erstwhile Confederate commander of the notorious 
prisoner-of-war camp at Andersonville, Georgia, was tried before a federal 
Military Commission for the maltreatment of the prisoners of war in his custody, 
one of his defenses was "superior orders." In his personal summation Wirz said:4 
I think I may also claim as a self-evident proposition that ifI, a subaltem officer, 
merely obeyed the legal orders of my superiors in the discharge of my official 
duties, I cannot be held responsible for the motives that dictated such orders. 
Against this claim the prosecutor asserted:5 
I know that it is urged that during all this time he was acting under General 
Winder's orders, and for the purpose of argument I will concede that he was so 
acting. A superior officer cannot order a subordinate to do an illegal act, and if a 
subordinate obey such an order and disastrous consequences result, the superior 
and the subordinate must answer for it. General Winder could no more command 
the prisoner to violate the laws of war than could the prisoner do so without 
orders. The conclusion is plain, that where such orders exist both are guilty .... 
And notwithstanding his earnest appeal, made to you in his final statement, 
begging that he, a poor subaltern, acting only in obedience to his superior, should 
not bear the odium and punishment deserved, with whatever force these cries of 
a desperate man, in a desperate and terrible strait, may come to you, there is no 
law, no sympathy, no code of morals, that can warrant you in refusing to let him 
have all justice, because the lesser and not the greater criminal is on trial. 
Wirz was found guilty and he was sentenced to death.6 
It is interesting to note that in the first (1906) edition of his now famous and 
standard work on international law, Oppenheim said? 
If members of the armed forces commit violations by order of their Government, 
they are not war criminals and cannot be punished by the enemy; the latter can, 
however, resort to reprisals. In case members of forces commit violations ordered 
by their commanders, the members may not be punished, for the commanders 
are alone responsible, and the latter may, therefore, be punished as war criminals 
on their capture by the enemy. 
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That statement, or one closely resembling it, appeared in the subsequent 
editions of Oppenheim's treatise, with its various editors, including the first 
edition (the 5th) edited by Lauterpacht.8 In the next (6th) edition Lauterpacht 
reversed hirl'Iself9 and in the 7th edition, the last that he edited (and the last 
edition of the second volume that has appeared to date), the following rule is 
set forth:10 
253. The fact that a rule of warfare has been violated in pursuance of an order 
of the belligerent Govemment or of an individual belligerent commander does 
not deprive the act in question of its character as a war crime; neither does it, in 
principle, confer upon the perpetrator immunity from punishment by the injured 
belligerent. A different view has occasionally been adopted in military manuals, 
and by writers, but it is difficult to regard it as expressing a sound legal principle. 
Undoubtedly, a Court confronted with the plea of superior orders adduced in 
justification of a war crime is bound to take into consideration the fact that 
obedience to military orders, not obviously unlawful, is the duty of every member 
of the armed forces and that the latter cannot, in conditions of war discipline, be 
expected to weigh scrupulously, the legal merits of the order received; that rules 
of warfare are often controversial; and that an act otherwise amounting to a war 
crime may have been executed in obedience to orders conceived as a measure of 
reprisals. Such circumstances are probably in themselves sufficient to divest the 
act of the stigma of a war crime .... However, subject to these qualifjcations, the 
question is governed by the major principle that members of the armed forces are 
bound to obey lawful orders only and that they cannot therefore escape liability 
if, in obedience to a command, they commit acts which both violate unchallenged 
rules of warfare and outrage the general sentiment of humanity. 
The Preliminary Peace Conference which met at Versailles in 1919 to draft 
a treaty of peace with Germany at the end of World War II established a 
Commission on the Responsibility oj the Authors oj the War and on Enforcement oj 
Penalties with the task of inquiring into and reporting upon, among other things, 
the degree of responsibility for breaches of the laws and customs of war. In its 
report the Commission listed thirty-two types of violations of the laws and 
customs of war and, concerning the defense of superior orders, its report 
. 1 d 11 unammous y state : 
We desired to say that civil and military authorities cannot be relieved from 
responsibility by the mere fact that a higher authority might have been convicted 
of the same offence. It will be for the court to decide whether a plea of superior 
orders is sufficient to acquit the person charged from responsibility. 
Article 228 of the Treaty oj Versailles which actually ended World War I for 
many of the belligerents required the German Government to hand over to the 
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Allied Governments for trial "all persons accused of having committed an act in 
violation of the laws and customs ofwar.,,12 In the face of the public opinion 
prevailing in Germany at that time no Government could have survived 
compliance with such a requirement and so it was subsequently agreed that the 
individuals named would, instead, be tried by the Supreme Court of Leipzig. 
The trials were a fiasco;13 but in one of them, involving the trial of two officers 
who had obeyed the order of their commanding officer to fire upon the lifeboats 
of a hospital ship which their submarine had torpedoed, the German Court said:14 
It is true that according to the [German] Military Penal Code, if the execution 
'of an order in the ordinary course of duty involves such a violation of the law as 
is punishable, the superior officer issuing such an order is alone responsible. 
However, the subordinate obeying an order is liable to punishment, if it was 
known to him that the order of the superior involved the infringement of civil or 
military law. This applies in the case of the accused. It is certainly to be urged in 
favour of the military subordinates that they are under no obligation to question 
the order of their superior officer, and they can count upon its legality. But no 
such confidence can be held to exist, if such an order is universally known to 
everybody, including the accused, to be without any doubt whatever against the 
law. 
The accused were found guil~ by the Court and were sentenced to 
•. fc f 15 Impnsonment or a term 0 years. 
While the 1922 Treaty cf Washington16 never came into force because of the 
failure of ratification by France, it is of interest to note that Article 3 thereof stated: 
The Signatory Powers, desiring to ensure the enforcement of the humane rules 
of existing law declared by them with respect to attacks upon and the seizure and 
destruction of merchant ships, further declare that any person in the service of any 
Power who shall violate any of those rules, whether or not such person is under 
orders of a governmental superior, shall be deemed to have violated the laws of 
war and shall be liable to trial and punishment as if for an act of piracy and may 
be brought to trial before the civil or military authorities of any Power within the 
jurisdiction of which he may be found. 
Although the inter-war period (1919-1939) was far from free ofintemational 
hostilities, the subject of war crimes trials appears to have been raised, or even 
written about by the students of the subject, on comparatively few occasions. 17 
World War II and its Aftermath 
All during the course of World War II there had been statements made by 
the Allies that there would be trials for those major war criminals who had 
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plunged the world into catastrophic war and for those individuals who had 
otherwise violated international law.1S A private conference of British and 
European jurists from occupied countries which met in Cambridge in 
November 1941 established a committee to draft rules and procedures to govern 
war crimes trials. The sub-committee on superior orders concluded that 
generally speaking, the codes oflaw of the respective countries recognize the plea 
of superior orders to be valid if the order is given by a superior to an inferior 
officer, within the course of his duty and within his normal competence, provided 
the order is not blatantly illegal. The conclusion reached was that each case must 
be considered on its own merits, but that the plea is not an automatic defence.19 
The London International Assembly, established by the League of Nations 
Union of Great Britain, adopted a resolution which included the following with 
respect to the defense of superior orders?O 
(a) That an order given by a superior to an inferior to commit a crime violating 
intemationallaw was not in itself a defence, but that the Courts were entitled to 
consider whether the accused was placed in a 'state of compulsion' to act as 
ordered, and acquit him or mitigate the punishment accordingly; 
(b) That such exculpating or extenuating circumstances should in all cases be 
disregarded in two types of cases: when the act was so obviously heinous that it 
could not be committed without revolting the conscience of an average human 
being; and when the accused was, at the time of the offence, a member of an 
organization whose membership implied the execution of criminal orders. 
The United Nations Commission for the Investigation of War Crimes (later the 
United Nations War Crimes Commission) was established in London on 20 
October 1943 by 17 of the States at war with Germany and Japan. (The Soviet 
Union was not represented at this meeting, nor did it later participate in the 
activities of the Commission.)21 Its Legal Committee concluded that a general 
understanding between the victorious belligerent nations on the subject of 
superior orders was desirable and stated that it believed the following rule to be 
. ·h· . all 22 conSIstent Wit mternatlOn aw: 
The defence of obedience to superior orders shall not constitute ajustification 
for the commission of an offence against the laws and customs of war, if the order 
was so manifestly contrary to those laws or customs that, taking into account his 
rank or position and the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offence, 
an individual of ordinary understanding would have known that such an order 
was illegal. 
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This recommendation did not meet with unanimous support and the 
Commission's Enforcement Committee eventually recommended that the 
Commission submit the following statement to the Governments?3 
The Conunission has considered the question of 'superior orders'. It finally 
decided to leave out any provision on the subject .... The Conunission considers 
that it is better to leave it to the court itself in each case to decide what weight 
should be attached to a plea of superior orders. But the Conunission wants to 
make it clear that its members unanimously agree that in principle this plea does 
not of itself exonerate the offenders. 
Finally, in March 1945, the Commission itself adopted the following 
.. 24 pOSlt:l.on: 
Having regard to the fact that many, if not most, of the members States have 
legal rules on the subject, some of which have been adopted very recently, and 
that in most cases these rules differ from one another, and to the further 
consideration that the question how far obedience to the orders of a superior 
exonerates an offender or mitigates the punishment must depend on the 
circumstances of the particular case, the Commission does not consider that it can 
usefully propound any principle or rule. 
The Conunission unanimously maintains the view . . . that the mere fact of 
having acted in obedience to the orders of a superior does not of itself relieve a 
person who has conunitted a war crime from responsibility. 
Early in 1945 the United States prepared a draft of a proposal for an 
international military tribunal to try the major German war criminals. Paragraph 
25 11 of that proposal stated: 
The fact that a defendant acted pursuant to order of a superior or government 
sanction shall not constitute an absolute defense but may be considered either in 
defense or in mitigation of punishment if the tribunal before which the charges 
are being tried determines that justice so requires. 
That proposal was submitted to the representatives of the Provisional French 
Government, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom at San Francisco in 
April 1945, together with a later draft in which a paragraph concerning trial 
procedures contained a sub-paragraph stating that any agreement on the matter 
should include a provision which could, 
(c) except as the court in its discretion shall deem appropriate in particular cases, 
exclude any defense based upon the fact that the accused acted under orders of a 
. ffi ·alli 26 supenor 0 cer or pursuant to state or natlon po cy. 
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Then, on 14 June 1945, the United States distributed a revision of its draft 
proposal, a document which later became the working paper for the London 
Conference which met to draft the definitive Charter of the International 
Military Tribunal. Paragraph 15 of that revision statedP 
In any trial before an International Military Tribunal the fact that a defendant 
acted pursuant to order of a superior or government sanction shall not constitute 
a defense per se, but may be considered either in defense or in mitigation of 
punishment if the tribunal determines that justice so requires. 
In a further Revised Draft submitted by the United States on 30 June 1945, 
during the course of the London Conference, the relevant paragraph now read?8 
17. The fact that a defendant acted pursuant to order of a superior or to 
government sanction shall not constitute a defense per se, but may be considered 
in mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal determines that justice so requires. 
A Soviet proposal which was tabled at the Conference on 2July 1945 stated?9 
ARTICLE 29 
Carrying Out of an Order 
The carrying out by the defendant of an order of his superior or government 
shall not be considered a reason excluding his responsibility for the crimes set out 
in Article 2 of this Statute. In certain cases, when the subordinate acted blindly in 
carrying out the orders of this superior, the Tribunal has right to mitigate the 
punishment of the defendant. 
A drafting subcommittee was then created by the Conference. The provision 
which it drafted on the question of superior orders varied little from that set 
forth in the last revision proposed by the United States?O 
8. The fact that the defendant acted pursuant to order of a superior or the 
Government sanction shall not free him from responsibility but may be considered 
in mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal determines that justice so requires. 
In what was apparently the only real discussion of superior orders which took 
place at the London Conference, the following occurred?1 
General Nikitchenko: In article 7 [8?] of the Charter I do not propose any 
change but would like to point out two considerations. Would it be proper really 
in speaking of major criminals to speak of them as carrying out some order of a 
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superior? This is not a question of principle really, but I wonder if thatis necessary 
when speaking of major criminals. 
Sir David Maxwell Fyfe: There are two points: first, they have already said they 
were just doing what Hitler said they should do; and secondly, in international 
law, certainly in some cases, superior orders were a defense, but in the sixth and 
seventh editions of Oppenheim it appears that they aren't a defense. If we don't 
make it clear, we may have some trouble on it. 
General Nikitchenko: There is a misunderstanding. I wasn't against disallowing 
orders of a superior as a defense, but I thought that in regard to major criminals 
it would be improper to say that superior orders could be used in mitigation of 
punishment. 
Sir David Maxwell Fyfe: It seems to me difficult. Suppose someone said, he 
was threatened to be shot ifhe did not carry out Hitler's orders. Ifhe wasn't too 
important, the Tribunal might let him off with his life. It seems 'to be a matter for 
the Tribunal. 
In one of the German cases on trial which were such a farce after the last war 
they did say that superior orders were no defense but could be taken into account 
on mitigation. That has been the general rule on superior orders in international 
law books. 
General Nikitchenko: If the other heads of the delegations consider it best, we 
have no intention of pressing it. In general, it should be considered in mitigation; 
we think it is proper. 
**** 
Judge Falco: Is it necessary to indicate to the Tribunal the reason for mitigation? 
If we say simply that orders are not a defense, it would seem to be left to the 
tribunal to say that they may be in mitigation. 
Mr Justice Jackson: That is about what we proposed originally-not an absolute 
defense but a mitigation. 
Sir David Maxwell Fyfe: The important part is that it should not be an absolute 
defense. 
Judge Falco: That is the important part. Must we add that that is the reason for 
the Tribunal to consider mitigation? 
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With some minor editing the Article 8 set forth above became Article 8 of 
the Charter of the International Military Tribunal which later sat in Nuremberg. 
As finally adopted it stated:32 
Article 8. The fact that the Defendant acted pursuant to order of his 
Government or of a superior shall not free him from responsibility, but may be 
considered in mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal determines that justice sq 
requires. 
In applyin~ that rule at the Nuremberg Trial the International Military 
Tribunal said: 3 
The provisions of this Article are in conformity with the law of all nations. 
That a soldier was ordered to kill or torture in violation of the intemationallaw 
of war has never been recognized as a defense to such acts of brutality, though, as 
the Charter here provides, the order may be urged in mitigation of the punishment. 
The true test, which is found in varying degrees in the criminal law of most nations, 
is not the existence of the order, but whether moral choice was in fact possible. 
Another statement in that judgment was to effect that34 
When they [certain of the defendants] with knowledge of his [Hitler's] aims, 
gave him their cooperation, they made themselves parties to the plan he had 
initiated. They are not to be deemed innocent because Hitler made use of them, 
if they knew what they were doing. That they were assigned to their tasks by a 
dictator does not absolve them from responsibility for their acts. The relation of 
leader and follower does not preclude responsibility here any more than it does 
in the comparable tyranny of organized domestic crime.35 
In considering whether the General Staff and the High Command of the 
Gennany anned forces should be found to be criminal organizations, the 
Tribunal said:36 
Many of these men have made a mockery of the soldier's oath of obedience 
to military orders. When it suits their defense they say they had to obey; when 
confronted with Hitler's brutal crimes, which are shown to have been within their 
general knowledge, they say they disobeyed. 
On 20 December 1945 the Allied Control Council for Gennany, consisting 
of military representatives of the Occupying Powers, the same four nations 
which had drafted the London Charter of the International Military Tribunal, 
promulgated Allied Control Council Law No. 10, setting forth the basis for the 
trials in Gennany of war criminals other than those to be tried by the 
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International Military Tribunal.37 The provisions of Article II( 4) (b) of that Law 
with respect to superior orders were substantially the same as those of the London 
Charter: 
The fact that any person acted pursuant to the order ofhis Government or of 
a superior does not free him from responsibility for a crime, but may be considered 
in mitigation. 
In The Hostage Case the Tribunal, convened pursuant to Law No. 10, held:38 
Implicit obedience to orders of superior officers is almost indispensable to every 
military system. But this implies obedience to lawful orders only. If the act done 
pursuant to a superior's orders be murder, the production of the order will not 
make it any less so. It may mitigate but it cannot justify the order. We are of the 
view, however, that if the illegality of the order was not known to the inferior, 
and he could not reasonably have been expected to know of its illegality, no 
wrongful intent necessary to the commission of a crime exists and the inferior will 
be protected. But the general rule is that members of the armed forces are bound 
to obey only the lawful orders of their commanding officers and they cannot escape 
criminal liability by obeying a command which violates international law and 
outrages fundamental concepts of justice. 
In effect, here the Tribunal was saying that if the subordinate did not know 
and could not be expected to know that the order was illegal, there was no 
criminal intent, no mens rea, and the subordinate would not be guilty. The 
opinion in The Einsatsgruppen Case is to the same effect, the Tribunal there having 
·d 39 Sal : 
Those of the defendants who admit participation in the mass killings which are 
the subject of this trial, plead that they were under military orders and, therefore, 
had no will of their own. As intent is a basic prerequisite to responsibility for 
crime, they argue that they are innocent of criminality since they performed the 
admitted executions under duress, that is to say, superior orders. The defendants 
formed part of a military organization and were, therefore, subject to the rules 
which govern soldiers. It is axiomatic that a military man's first duty is to obey. If 
the defendants were soldiers and as soldiers responded to the command of their 
superiors to kill certain people, how can they be held guilty of crime? That is the 
question posed by the defendants. The answer is not a difficult one. 
The obedience of a soldier is not the obedience of an automaton. A soldier is 
a reasoning agent. He does not respond, and is not expected to respond, like a 
piece of machinery. It is a fallacy of wide-spread consumption that a soldier is 
required to do everything his superior officer orders him to do .... The fact that a 
soldier may not, without incurring unfavorable consequences, refuse to drill, 
salute, exercise, reconnoiter, and even go into battle, does not mean that he must 
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fulfill every demand put to him. In the first place, an order to require obedience 
must relate to military duty. An officer may not demand of a soldier, for instance, 
that he steal for him. And what the superior officer may not militarily demand of 
his subordinate, the subordinate is not required to do. Even if the order refers to 
a military subject it must be one which the superior is authorized, under the 
circumstances, to give. 
The subordinate is bound only to obey the lawful orders ofhis superior and if 
he accepts a criminal order and executes it with a malice of his own, he may not 
plead superior orders in mitigation of his offense. If the nature of the ordered act 
is manifesdy beyond the scope of the superior's authority, the subordinate may 
not plead ignorance to the criminality of the order. If one claims duress in the 
execution of an illegal order it must be shown that the harm caused by obeying 
the illegal order is not disproportionally greater than the harm which would result 
from not obeying the illegal order.40 
In High Command Case, the Tribunal before which that case was tried quoted 
a 1944 statement of Goebbels, the Nazi Propaganda Minister, in which he had 
·d 41 Sal : 
It is not provided in any military law that a soldier in the case of a despicable 
crime is exempt from punishment because he passes the responsibility to his 
superior, especially if orders of the latter are in evident contradiction to all human 
morality and every international usage of warfare. 
As would be expected, that statement was made in his official capacity as 
Minister of Propaganda and referred to alleged acts of Allied troops. It was not 
intended as a statement of German military law, nor as an admonition to the 
German soldier. 
Concerning the act of an intermediate headquarters in passing down to its 
subordinate commands an order received from higher headquarters, the Tribunal 
in High Command Case went on to say:42 
Military commanders in the field with far reaching military responsibilities 
cannot be charged under international law with criminal participation in issuing 
orders which are not obviously criminal or which they are not shown to have 
known to be criminal under international law. Such a commander cannot be 
expected to draw fine distinctions and conclusions as to legality in connection 
with orders issued by his superiors. He has the right to presume, in the absence 
of specific knowledge to the contrary, that the legality of such orders has been 
properly determined before their issuance. He cannot be held criminally 
responsible for a mere error in judgment as to disputable legal questions. 
It is therefore considered that to find a field commander criminally responsible 
for the transmittal of such an order, he must have passed the order to the chain of 
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command and the order must be one that is criminal on its face, or one which he 
is shown to have known was criminal. 
In a digest of the laws applied by various courts which conducted war crimes 
trials after World War II the United Nations War Crimes Commission said:43 
The plea of superior orders has been raised by the Defence in war crimes trials 
more frequendy than any other. The most common form of the plea consists in 
the argument that the accused was ordered to commit the offence by a military 
superior and that under military discipline orders must be obeyed. A closely related 
argument is that which claims that had the accused not obeyed he would have 
been shot or otherwise punished; it is sometimes also maintained in court that 
reprisals would have been taken against his family. 
It has often been said that an accused is entided under international law to obey 
commands which are lawful or which he could not reasonably be expected to 
know were unlawful. The question, however, arises whether these commands 
must be lawful under municipal law or international law; ... the legality under 
municipal law of the acc;used's acts does not free him from liability to punishment 
if those acts constitute war crimes, and it seems to follow that the plea of having 
acted upon orders which were legal under municipal law must also fail to constitute 
a defence. On the other hand, if the order is legal under international law, it is 
difficult to show how an act committed in obedience to it could be illegal under 
that system.... The true test in practice is whether an order, illegal under 
international law, on which an accused has acted was or must be presumed to 
have been known to him to be so illegal, or was obviously so illegal ("illegal on 
its face" to use the term employed by the Tribunal in the High Command Trial) 
or should have been recognised by him as being so illegal. 
The provisions contained in Article 8 of the London Charter denying superior 
orders as a defense and limiting its application to mitigation of punishment were 
followed by many of the laws enacted and orders issued after the conclusion of 
World War II which were concerned with the trials of violators of the laws and 
customs of war. Thus, the Charter attached to the Special Proclamation creating 
the International Military Tribunal for the Far East QMTFE), issued on 19 January 
1946 by General Douglas MacArthur as Supreme Commander for the Allied 
Powers (SCAP), included the following provisions:44 
Article 6. Responsibility of Accused. Neither the official position, at any time, 
of an accused, nor the fact that an accused acted pursuant to order of his 
government or of a superior shall, of itself, be sufficient to free such an accused 
from responsibility for any crime with which he is charged, but such circumstances 
may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal determines that 
justice so requires. 
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None of the judges of the IMTFE, concurring or dissenting, found it necessary 
to advert to the quoted provision of its Charter either in the lengthy judgment 
. h h .. 45 or 10 t e ot er op1OIOns. 
As we have already seen, Article 8 of the London Charter was also the source 
for the cognate provision of Allied Control Council Law No. 10 and for similar 
provisions issued in other occupied territories.46 
United Nations 
On 11 December 1946 the General Assembly of the United Nations 
unanimously adopted a resolution the first operative paragraph of which stated 
that the General Assembly: 47 
Affirms the principles of international law recognized by the Charter of the 
Nuremberg Tribunal and the judgment of the Tribunal. 
Another operative paragraph charged its Committee on Codification Qater 
changed to the International Law Commission) with the formulation of those 
principles, either in the context of a code of offenses against the peace and 
security of mankind or of an international criminal code. When the International 
Law Commission had prepared its first draft in complying with the task assigned 
to it of "formulating" the principles of international law recognized in the 
London Charter and in the Judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal, its Principle 
IV read as follows: 48 
The fact that a person acted pursuant to order ofhis Government or of a superior 
does not relieve him from responsibility under international law , provided a moral 
choice was in fact possible to him. 
The overall document received a mixed reception in the Sixth Committee 
of the General Assembly, the result of which was the preparation of a draft 
resolution, later adopted by the General Assembly,49 referring it to member 
States for comment, a process which had early evolved in the United Nations 
as a method of indefinite postponement. 
The following year, in accordance with the directive received from the 
General Assembly, the International Law Commission began to work on a Draft 
Code of O.ffonces Against the Peace and Security of Mankind. Article 4 of the first 
draft text prepared by the Special Rapporteur, J. Spiropoulos, stated:50 
The fact that a person charged with a crime defined in this code acted under 
the orders of a government or a superior may be taken into consideration either 
as a defence or in mitigation of punishment if justice so requires. 
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This proved unacceptable to the Commission which modified the 
Rapporteur's proposal to read:51 
The fact that a person charged with an offence defined in this Code acted 
pursuant to order of his government or of a superior does not relieve him from 
responsibility, provided a moral choice was in fact possible to him. 
In its commentary on this Article the Commission said: 
Principle IV of the Commission's formulation of the Nuremberg principles, 
on the basis of the interpretation given by the Nuremberg Tribunal to article 8 
of its Charter, states: "The fact that a person acted pursuant to order of his 
Government or of a superior does not relieve him from responsibility under 
international law, provided a moral choice was in fact possible to him." 
The observations on principle IV, made in the General Assembly during its 
fifth session, have been carefully studied; no substantial modification, however, 
has been made in the drafting of this article, which is based on a clear enunciation 
by the Nuremberg Tribunal. The article lays down the principle that the accused 
is responsible only if, in the circumstances, it was possible for him to act contrary 
to superior orders. 
The International Law Commission's Draft Code did not meet with any 
greater acceptance in the General Assembly than had its formulation of the 
Nuremberg Principles and the project was shelved for some time. When it was 
once again taken up by the Commission in 1954, Article 4 was redrafted to 
state:52 
The fact that a person charged with an offence defined in this Code acted 
pursuant to an order of his Government or of a superior does not relieve him of 
responsibility in international law if, in the circumstances at the time, it was possible 
for him not comply with that order. 
This time the Commission's commentary stated: 
Since some Governments had criticized the expression 'moral choice', the 
Commission decided to replace it by the wording of the new text above. 
However, on the recommendation of its Sixth Commission, the General 
Assembly postponed all action on the draft Code until a decision had been 
reached on the definition of aggression. 53 This did not occur until 197 4 and the 
Drcift Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind did not reappear 
on the agenda of the International Law Commission until 1981. During its 1984 
session it once again started to have annual discussions on the subject. Most of 
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its time has been spent on the question of the offenses to be included and through 
1986 the problem of superior orders had not been reached for discussion. As a 
result, today, almost forty years later, the efforts of the International Law 
Commission to "formulate" the Nuremberg Principles and to draft a code of 
offenses against the peace and security of mankind have still not been successful. 
On the same day that it adopted the resolution on the "formulation" of the 
Nuremberg Principles and the drafting of a code of offenses, the General 
Assembly adopted another resolution which requested the Economic and Social 
Council to draw up a convention on genocide.54 The Council, in turn, 
requested the Secretary-General to collate the comments received and to prepare 
a draft convention on the subject. Article V of his draft provided:55 
Command of the law or superior orders shall not justify genocide. 
No provision on the subject of superior orders appears in the convention as 
eventually drafted and adopted.56 
Other International Efforts to Codify the Rule 
We have seen the actions taken by the United Nations General Assembly, 
and by its subordinate bodies, concerning the codification of the rule with respect 
to the non-availability of the defense of superior orders in international criminal 
trials. Now let us review the efforts of other international bodies on this subject. 
In 1948 the XVIIth (Stockholm) International Red Cross Conference 
recommended that the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) draft 
provisions for the repression of breaches of the humanitarian conventions which 
were then in the process of evolution57 and which ultimately became the four 
1949 Geneva Conventionsforthe Protedion cifWar Victims.58 The ICRC complied 
with that resolution and, with the help of a small group of recognized experts, 
drafted a number of separate provisions on the subject, one of which provided:59 
ARTICLE 40 (a) 
The fact that the accused acted in obedience to the orders of a superior or in 
pursuance of a law or regulation shall not constitute a valid defence, if the 
prosecution can show that in view of the circumstances the accused had reasonable 
grounds to assume that he was committing a breach of this Convention. In such 
a case the punishment may nevertheless be mitigated or remitted, if the 
circumstances justify. 
With respect to this proposed provision the ICRC said:60 
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It establishes, within prescribed limits, the responsibility of offenders; it rejects 
the principle, recognized in various military penal codes, that orders received from 
a superior exculpate the subordinate who has carried them out. 
The text proposed does not, however, go as far as the Declaration of London 
of August 8, 1945, which, in the case of ' war crimes', only admitted the plea of 
superior orders as a possible extenuating circumstance, the executor of the order 
bearing full responsibility. 
The suggested text appears to the ICRC to be an acceptable compromise 
between obedience to orders,-an essential prerequisite of military 
discipline,-and the moral duty to oppose any patent atrocity, such as the massacre 
of defenceless women and children. 
It should be noted that the onus of proof lies on the prosecution. This is 
important in view of the £lct that certain legislations called upon the accused to 
prove that he was not guilty. 
The experts debated whether, even in the case of flagrant participation in such 
violations, the threat of death were not sufficient to constitute a legal excuse for 
obeying superior orders. No concession of this kind was however made, as every 
latitude is left to the judge to mitigate or remit punishment. This power of 
discretion seems the best practical solution to the conflict on this point between 
English and Continental conceptions oflaw. 
The few bits of legislative history which are available on this subject, 
particularly the report of its Special Committee, indicate that the 1949 
Diplomatic Conference discarded the forgoing provision on the following 
b . 61 aslS: 
[N]or could general agreement be reached at this stage regarding the notions 
of complicity, attempted violation, duress or legitimate defense or the plea 'by 
orders of a superior'. These should be left to the judges who would apply the 
national laws. 
The Diplomatic Conference is not here to work out international penal law. 
Bodies fur more competent than we are have tried to do it for years. 
As a result, no provision with respect to superior orders appears in the 1949 
Geneva Conventions. 
In 1971 the ICRe convened a Conference of Government Experts to 
consider the drafting of a protocol to the 1949 Geneva Conventions which, 
among other things, would remedy some of the defects in those Conventions 
which had surfaced over the years. One of the conclusions reached by 
Commission IV of that first conference was to the effect that:62 
556. A number of shortcomings in the Conventions should be remedied. They 
concerned, in particular, the question of superior orders. That problem had not 
been provided for in the Conventions, and it was necessary to specify precisely 
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under what conditions an accused person could plead that he had received orders 
from a superior, as a justification for his commission of an act forbidden by the 
Conventions. In order to remedy that deficiency it would be necessary to be 
guided by the work of the United Nations which itself took as a basis the principles 
laid down by the Nuremberg tribunal. 
Apparently the ICRC felt that there was more justification in the decision of 
the 1949 Diplomatic Conference than in the recommendation of the 1971 
Conference of Government Experts and when it prepared a draft Protocol to 
the 1949 Geneva Conventions for consideration by various other preliminary 
conferences which it was about to convene, that draft included the following 
rather innocuous paragraph in its Article 75:63 
2. The High Contracting Parties shall determine the procedure to be followed 
for all application of the principle under which a subordinate is exempted from 
any duty to obey an order which would lead him to commit a grave breach of 
the provisions of the Conventions and of the present Protocol. 
In its Commentary on that provision the ICRC said:64 
In particular, it [the I CRe] considered that the basic question of superior orders 
should be settled at the national level, in a manner consistent with the guidelines 
laid down in the Judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal, namely, that it should be 
possible for soldiers to refuse to obey an order which, if carried out, would 
constitute a serious infraction of humanitarian rules. The military regulations of 
some countries already contain a provision regarding superior orders and 
submission to rank, whereby superiors must only issue orders which conform to 
intemationallaw and subordinates are relieved from the obligation to obey an 
order which would be contrary thereto and which would cause them to commit 
a crime or an offence. 
The summary of the discussions of this article that took place at the 1972 
(Second) Conference of Government Experts, convened by the ICRC to review 
and propose changes in the draft Protocol which the ICRC had prepared, 
indicates some of the problems that have been encountered in the efforts to 
I . 1· . all . hi I 65 egts ate mternatIon y m t s area. t states: 
4.123. A number of experts approved the introduction of a provision on 
superior orders, such as proposed in draft Article 75, § 2 of the ICRC text .... 
The language of that paragraph did not, however, seem sufficiendy clear and a 
number of amendments were proposed. It was pointed out that attempts had been 
made in several national legislations to give a satisfactory formulation of the defence 
of superior orders, a concept recognized by the Charter and the Judgment of the 
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International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg; but so fur it had appeared 
impossible to find a formula that would really cover all situations and on which 
agreement would be general. It would not be right to limit the scope of the defence 
to grave breaches only (as the ICRC draft did). According to one expert, it should 
be stipulated that the subordinate not merely had the right, but was obliged, to 
disobey the unlawful order. Some experts, however, were ofa completely opposite 
view and demanded the deletion of the proposed paragraph. They laid emphasis 
on the necessity to respect the exigencies of military discipline, and they pointed 
out that it would be difficult in time of armed conflict to permit soldiers to decide 
whether to obey or not. It was equally considered that the approach to this question 
should be far more general and that the principles recognized by the Nuremberg 
Tribunal, the Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind 
should be taken into account. 
Actually, there were five separate proposals on the subject of superior orders, 
none of which was adopted by the Conference.66 The 1CRC thereupon took 
it upon itself to include the following provisions in the Draft Additional Protocol 
I prepared by it for use as the Working Document of the Diplomatic Conference 
which the Swiss Government had already agreed to host beginning in April 
1974:67 
ARTICLE 77. - Superior orders 
1. No person shall be punished for refusing to obey an order, of his government 
or of a superior which, if carried out, would constitute a grave breach of the 
provisions of the Conventions or of the present Protocol. 
2. The fact of having acted pursuant to an order of his government or of a 
superior does not absolve an accused person from penal responsibility if it be 
established that, in the circumstances at the time, he should have reasonably known 
that he was committing a grave breach of the Conventions or of the present 
Protocol and that he had the possibility of refusing to obey the order. 
The 1CRC's Commentary on that provision stated:68 
It was pointed out that this provision might put soldiers in an extremely difficult 
position, as they were compelled by military laws and regulations to obey orders 
issued to them. That is the reason why it was thought necessary to add to the 
sentence "he should have reasonably known that he was committing a grave 
breach" the words "and that he had the possibility of refusing to obey the order." 
These provisions fared no better in the Diplomatic Conference which drafted 
the 1977 Protocol 169 than had the comparable provision proposed by the 1CRC 
in 1949 fared in the earlier Diplomatic Conference. Fortunately for the 
researcher, the action on these provisions is better documented than was that of 
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its 1949 predecessor. After considerable debate in Committee I during the 1976 
and 1977 sessions of the Diplomatic Conference, a roll call vote was taken in 
that Committee to make the basic determination as to whether an article on 
superior orders should be included in the Protocol which was being drafted. 
That roll call resulted in a favorable vote of 34/9/35.1° To implement that 
decision the followi~f article was subsequendy approved by the Committee by 
a vote of38/22/15: 
Article 77. - Superior orders 
1. The High Contracting Parties undertake to ensure that their intemallaw 
penalizing disobedience to orders shall not apply to orders that would constitute 
grave breaches of the Conventions and this Protocol. 
2. The mere fact of having acted pursuant to an order of an authority or a 
superior does not absolve an accused person from penal responsibility, if it be ' 
established that in the circumstances at the time he knew or should have known 
that he was committing a grave breach of the Conventions or of this Protocol. It 
may, however, be taken into account in mitigation of punishment. 
The breadth of the differing views of the various delegations was indicated 
by the fact some twenty-five of them found it necessary to explain their votes.72 
Those explanations fell into three general categories: the proposed article either 
did, or did not, draw the necessary balance between compliance with 
humanitarian law and military discipline; the proposed article either did, or did 
not, draw an adequate distinction between national and international law; and 
the proposed article properly, or improperly, limited its coverage to "grave 
breaches" of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and of the Protocol. Thereafter, 
with a minimum of discussion, the article was taken up by the Plenary Meeting 
on 30 May 1977 and resulted in a vote 36/25/25.13 As the Conference rules 
required a two-thirds majority for the inclusion in the 1977 Protocol I, the vote 
constituted a rejection of the article on superior orders. (Although abstainers 
were not considered as voting, the 36 affirmative votes out of 61 votes cast 
amounted to only 59% of the total. To have been included in the 1977 Protocol 
I, 41 of the 61 votes cast were required.) 
Conclusion 
There has been no international activity in this area since the rejection by the 
Diplomatic Conference in 1977 of the provision adopted by the Committee of 
that Conference. The current discussions in the International Law Commission 
appear to have completely eliminated any reference to the subject; and the 
present author is inclined to believe that even if the Commission were to adopt 
a provision, perhaps similar to that contained in its 1954 draft of Code of Offences 
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Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, it is doubtful that such a provision would 
receive the approval of the Sixth (Legal) Committee of the General Assembly 
or that it would be included in any convention submitted to the nations for 
adoption. In other words, it appears unlikely that there will be any internationally 
approved provision on the subject of superior orders in the foreseeable future?~ 
Where does that leave the matter? On two occasions specific proposals for 
provisions of major humanitarian conventions on the law of war which would 
have placed limitations on the availability of superior orders as a defense have 
been rejected by large, representative, Diplomatic Conferences. An organ of the 
United Nations eliminated such a proposal from the draft of the Genocide 
Convention prepared by its Secretary-General. Two specific proposals drafted 
by the International Law Commission which included provisions on the subject 
of superior orders have met with less than enthusiasm from the General Assembly 
of the United Nations. Although this latter was not necessarily directed against 
the proposed provisions with respect to superior orders, but might have been 
directed against other parts of the documents submitted by the Commission, the 
fact remains that in the more than forty years which have elapsed since the 
completion of the war crimes trials after World War II, there has been no 
successful drafting of such a provision by any international body-and there is 
none in ~ight. Unless applicable national law provides otherwise, any defense 
counsel in a future war crimes trial would be professionally derelict ifhe failed 
to assert to the trial court that the rule denying the availability of the defense of 
superior orders has been rejected as a rule of international law and that such a 
defense is available to an individual charged with the commission of a violation 
of the law of war. 
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